Constitution
§13.2 — Citizen Legislative Initiative
Read the operative provision in the annotated Constitution.
Open provision →The LM had published audit findings on electoral finance compliance in Year 4 and Year 6. Both found that the Republic's aggregate contribution limits — set by statute at the time of ratification — had not been updated to reflect the Republic's economic growth, and that the statutory ceiling allowed large donors to dominate the funding record. Both findings published the compliance evidence for legislative consideration. Both findings were on the NRS. The Assembly had not reviewed the limits.
The Electoral Finance Reform Coalition launched the §13.2 initiative in Year 8, Month 1. Their proposal was specific: reduce aggregate contribution limits by 40% in real terms from the current statutory value, establish a public matching fund for small donations (donations under 50 credits matched at 2:1 by the Republic up to a cap), and require real-time public disclosure to the Elections Panel of all contributions above a specified threshold. It was, in substance, the same reform package that had died in Assembly committee twice.
Phase One and Phase Two
Phase One required signatures equal to 1.2% of eligible voters in each of at least one-third of all States and Territories. Phase Two required 10% nationally, with Phase One signatures carrying over. The initiative launched across all States simultaneously — the coalition had organizational infrastructure from prior advocacy work on the same issue. The applicable petition statute required both phases to finish within twenty months of filing; the coalition used 15. At filing, the Elections Panel determined that the proposal complied with the §13.2(3) limits, reading the matching-fund clause as a funding policy for later appropriation. That is a threshold check, and no one sought timely judicial review within the fourteen-day period provided by the applicable statute.
8 mo.
Phase One duration
7 mo.
Phase Two duration
11.4%
National signatures at threshold
The Elections Panel certified the petition at Month 15 and transmitted it to the Assembly and Senate simultaneously. Under §13.2, the Legislature had 90 days to vote on the proposal as submitted. The Legislature could enact the proposal; if it did not enact it within 90 days, the proposal would go to a national referendum.
The Assembly Vote
The Assembly scheduled a floor vote at Day 72. The debate was substantive and unusually direct: members who opposed the bill said so, citing concerns about the matching-fund appropriation’s constitutional validity and fiscal cost and the real-time disclosure provision's implementation complexity. Members who supported it said they would have preferred the Assembly to act in Years 4 and 6 when the LM's audit findings made the case, and noted that the existence of this vote was itself evidence of the initiative system working as designed.
The vote was 97-103. The proposal failed to receive a majority in the Assembly. The Senate did not take it up. When the 90 days ended without enactment, the Elections Panel administered a national referendum on the proposal within 90 days.
The Referendum
§13.2 sets a higher referendum threshold than §13.1's optional referendum: passage requires 60% of votes cast, without a constitutional turnout floor. The higher threshold reflects the initiative's nature — citizens proposing legislation, rather than vetoing it.
§13.2 — The Result
63% in favor. 57% participation. The legislation passes.
The Elections Panel certified the successful referendum. The contribution-limit and disclosure provisions took effect. But certification could not cure the initiative’s matching-fund appropriation: §13.2(3) prohibits a citizen initiative from appropriating funds or altering revenue.
A person with standing challenged the provision in the competent court under §13.2(3). On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the clause committing Republic funds to a two-for-one match could not stand to the extent of that appropriation. It left the lawful contribution-limit and disclosure provisions in force. The Civic Consul published implementation guidance for those surviving provisions; no matching payments were authorized by the initiative.
The Assembly's Response
Fourteen days after certification, the Assembly introduced the Electoral Finance Integrity Act — a bill covering the same subject matter as the initiative, with different thresholds: a 30% (not 40%) reduction in contribution limits, no matching-fund appropriation, and real-time public reporting above a higher threshold while retaining disclosure of every contribution to the Elections Panel. The Senate passed it 33-28. The Civic Consul signed it.
The LM published an assessment within the week. The question was whether the Assembly's competing bill constituted legislation on "the same or substantially similar grounds" as the initiative — which would implicate the re-initiation bar of §13.1(7): a failed referendum or initiative "may not be re-initiated on the same or substantially similar grounds within three years." The LM noted, carefully, that the re-initiation bar applied to citizen re-initiation, not to the Legislature's independent authority to legislate. The Legislature could, at any time, pass legislation on any subject within its competence — including subjects where citizen initiatives had succeeded or failed.
The subsequent Act expressly amended the contribution limits and the threshold for real-time publication. Full disclosure of every contribution to the Elections Panel remained required under §8.1; neither statute could narrow that constitutional obligation. The matching-fund clause had already been struck down and could not survive through silence in the later Act.
The resulting framework used the later Act’s contribution limits and real-time publication threshold, with constitutional full-disclosure duties unchanged. Public matching remained a policy the Legislature could consider through ordinary budget and legislative procedures. Citizens’ support for it did not confer spending authority on an initiative.
What This Scenario Tests
§13.2 is the citizen initiative's legislative path — distinct from §13.1's referendum repeal power. §13.1 citizens react to legislation that exists. §13.2 citizens propose legislation that doesn't. The thresholds differ: §13.2's referendum requires sixty percent of votes cast, without a constitutional turnout floor, because enacting new legislation via direct vote requires a higher legitimacy threshold than repealing existing law.
The Legislature could legislate on the same subject after the successful initiative. Its changes had to satisfy the Constitution, including §8.1’s full-disclosure requirements. The initiative did not lock electoral-finance policy permanently, and the three-year bar on repeating a failed initiative did not restrict this ordinary legislative process.
The scenario separates popular approval from constitutional validity. The voters enacted the lawful reforms, the Court removed only the prohibited appropriation, and the Legislature later amended the surviving policy through ordinary law. A 63% vote could not authorize what §13.2 expressly withholds from citizen initiatives.