Constitution
§13.2 — Citizen Legislative Initiative
Read the operative provision in the annotated Constitution.
Open provision →The initiative begins where they usually do: with something the Legislature will not touch. Water contamination in three inland districts, an enforcement agency that has issued no penalty in six years, and a bill that dies in committee twice without a recorded vote.
The petition runs the two phases §13.2 requires. Phase One collects signatures across a third of all States and Territories — the geographic distribution requirement, which exists so that a single dense population center cannot place a national question by itself. Phase Two reaches 10% of eligible voters nationally, with Phase One's signatures carrying over. Both phases are authenticated through the National Voting System using Citizen Voting Credentials. The Elections Panel verifies the threshold.
The Legislature now has ninety days to enact the proposal. It does not. Under §13.2(2), the proposal proceeds to a direct citizen referendum, where it passes with 64% of votes cast and 58% participation — clearing the required sixty percent; the Constitution sets no turnout floor.
Four sections. The first three are ordinary regulatory law: monitoring requirements, a penalty schedule, a reporting obligation to the National Record System. The fourth authorizes inspectors to enter private property adjoining a contaminated watershed without a warrant, on the ground that contamination migrates and waiting for judicial authorization defeats the purpose.
That fourth section is the one that matters here, and not because it is unpopular. It passed with everything else. It is the one that runs into §1.7, which permits searches only on consent or prior judicial authorization, and which does not have a contamination exception.
Eligibility screening existed; it did not make a mistaken clearance conclusive.
§13.2(1) requires the Elections Panel to determine at filing whether an initiative complies with paragraph (3), with timely judicial review available under the applicable statutory procedures. In this example the Panel treated the entry clause as an ordinary inspection provision and found the proposal compliant; no timely challenge was filed. That threshold determination did not make unconstitutional warrantless entry valid or foreclose the later judicial challenge to the enacted statute.
So the initiative goes to the ballot. The people vote. And the constitutional question is asked afterward, by a court, on a petition anyone with standing may bring.
A property owner files in the competent inferior court under §§1.1 and 4.5. The case reaches the Supreme Court through the applicable appellate process. A constitutional challenge to a federal statute does not by itself establish Supreme Court original jurisdiction under §4.5(5).
The Court reviews it the way it reviews any statute.
An initiative enacted under this section is subject to this Constitution as any statute is, and may not narrow a right under Article I or appropriate funds or alter revenue.
An initiative that does so is void to the extent of the conflict.
The Court is not asked whether the initiative is wise, or whether the Legislature was right to ignore the underlying problem, or whether 64% is enough. It is asked the question it asks of every statute: does any part of this conflict with the Constitution? Section four does — it authorizes warrantless entry that §1.7 forbids. Sections one through three do not.
Section four was never law. The other three are, and have been since certification.
This is the phrase doing the work. A court that could void the whole initiative over one defective section would hold enormous power over any citizen-enacted law — every initiative would carry the risk that a single flawed clause sinks the entire effort, and the drafters of these petitions are not constitutional lawyers. Severability is what makes the mechanism survivable in practice.
An initiative is an ordinary statute and must comply with the existing Constitution. An amendment follows Article XVII’s higher thresholds and may change existing constitutional law, subject to procedural review and the prohibition on extinguishing non-derogable rights. Neither popular support nor a mistaken eligibility decision cures an unconstitutional statute.
Voted. That is the entire alternative, and it was available for ninety days.
Had the Legislature taken up the proposal, it could have amended section four into something §1.7 permits — an expedited prior-judicial-authorization process or a valid consent requirement. Legislative drafting exists in part to catch exactly this kind of problem before enactment. Declining to vote did not make the problem go away; it removed the body best equipped to fix it from the process.
The three surviving sections are now law that the Legislature never debated, in a form it did not shape. §13.2 is not primarily a way for citizens to legislate. It is a consequence attached to legislative refusal.
§13.1(7) bars re-initiation on the same or substantially similar grounds for three years. A failed initiative is not permanently settled; the bar lasts three years. But this initiative did not fail. It passed, and three-quarters of it is in force.
Nothing prevents a fresh initiative addressing entry authority in a constitutionally permissible form, and nothing prevents the Legislature from legislating on it tomorrow. The severed section left a gap that either body can now fill — with the difference that everyone involved has seen precisely which sentence the Constitution would not accept, and why.
Direct democracy and constitutional limits are usually presented as opposites: either the people decide, or a court overrides them. §13.2 declines the framing.
The people decided. The Panel screened eligibility before the vote but failed to identify this conflict; that mistake did not immunize the enacted law. The Court could not weigh the merits, could not substitute its judgment for the referendum's, and could not reach the three sections that violated nothing. What it could do was identify a specific conflict with a specific right and remove exactly that much — on grounds the Constitution wrote down in advance, rather than grounds the Court developed for the occasion.
The two routes have distinct limits. Optional repeal may reach laws containing appropriations or implementing constitutional duties, but cannot extinguish those duties or substitute a different appropriation amount. An initiative cannot narrow Article I rights, directly appropriate funds or alter taxes, duties or tariffs. Judicial review applies those boundaries to actual legal injury.