Constitution
§15.9 — Voluntary State Independence
Read the operative provision in the annotated Constitution.
Open provision →Carenthal's independence movement had been building for six years before the State legislature voted on whether to submit the question to citizens. The arguments were cultural, economic, and geographic — a coastal State that had always felt distinct from the interior, whose commercial relationships ran more naturally across the Western Sea than toward Eldenvar. None of that was constitutionally relevant. What mattered was whether the legislature could resolve by 2/3 majority to hold the referendum, and whether the referendum itself could clear both thresholds: 60% of votes cast, and 60% participation among eligible voters.
The legislature resolved 41-20. Two-thirds required 40.67 — the vote cleared it by one. The referendum was called. Under §15.9, the Republic's response was defined: it must provide factual information about the independence process upon request. No officer may induce or coerce the State to pursue or abandon its petition. The CC's office published a twelve-page factual summary to the NRS.
Referendum day: 62.1% of Carenthal's eligible voters participated. 61.3% voted in favor of independence. Both thresholds were met. The Elections Panel certified the result and published the independence petition to the NRS.
§15.9 — Publication and Continuation
The State cannot withdraw the published petition while the process continues.
Publication records the successful Stage One petition. §15.9 prohibits the State from withdrawing it while the process continues. That does not guarantee independence: failure at Stage Two or Stage Three causes the petition to lapse, after which Stage One may begin again without the five-year bar that applies to a failed Stage One referendum.
The first referendum authorizes a continuing constitutional process. The chamber votes, national referendum, and separation agreement still lie ahead. The State remains within the Republic until the agreement’s effective date.
§15.9 — Stage Two: Recusal and the Chamber Math
Both chambers vote within 90 days. The petitioning State's own members are recused.
Within 90 days of NRS publication, both chambers were required to hold a concurrent ratification vote. The required threshold — two-thirds — was calculated from the remaining seated members after recusal, not from the full chamber. Carenthal held 3 Assembly districts and 2 Senate seats. Those 5 members were recused from the vote entirely.
Assembly: 200 total seats, 3 recused, 197 eligible. Two-thirds threshold: 132 votes needed. The Assembly voted 136 in favor, 61 opposed. The threshold cleared.
Senate: 24 total seats (12 States, 2 each), 2 recused, 22 eligible. Two-thirds threshold: 15 votes needed. The Senate voted 15 in favor, 7 opposed. The threshold cleared.
The recusal mechanism is not a curiosity — it is load-bearing. It means a State seeking independence cannot help ratify its own departure. The vote must reflect the will of the Republic that remains, not the will of the State leaving it. A State with high political pull in both chambers might clear Stage One but find Stage Two harder. A State that is genuinely peripheral — as Carenthal was — may find Stage Two easier than a more integrated one would.
§15.9 — What Happens If Either Chamber Fails
Failure or non-vote within 90 days: the petition lapses. Stage One may restart without restriction.
If the Assembly had voted 118-79 — one short of the 119 needed — the petition would have lapsed. If either chamber had simply failed to schedule a vote within 90 days, the petition would have lapsed. In either case, Carenthal could immediately re-initiate Stage One: another legislative resolution, another referendum, another NRS publication. There is no five-year bar on restarting after a Stage Two failure — that bar applies only to a failed Stage One referendum on the same grounds. A Stage Two failure sends the process back to Stage One; Stage One succeeds again; Stage Two opens again.
This matters. It means that a determined State can persist through repeated Stage Two failures, building political pressure on the chambers until the math changes. The constitution does not cap the number of attempts. It only imposes the 90-day window and the recusal-adjusted threshold each time.
§15.9 — Transition Agreement
After the national referendum approves independence, the State and Legislature negotiate; the Senate ratifies the agreement by two-thirds.
After Stage Two passed, the Elections Panel administered Stage Three within 180 days. All eligible Republic voters, including Carenthal’s, could participate. In this scenario 63% approved independence on 58% turnout, exceeding the required 60% vote and 55% participation thresholds. Had it failed, the petition would have lapsed and Stage One could restart.
After certification of the affirmative national vote, Carenthal and the Legislature negotiated a separation agreement covering assets, liabilities, borders, timing, fiscal obligations, and continuing obligations. The Senate ratified it by two-thirds of full seated membership and it was published to the NRS. The Stage Two recusal rule did not apply to this agreement vote. Independence took effect on the date specified in the agreement.
Constitutional Finding
§15.9 requires three separate approvals before negotiation of the final separation agreement: the State’s 60%/60% referendum, concurrent chamber approval by two-thirds excluding the petitioning State’s members, and national approval at 60% with at least 55% participation. Hard, by design — but each step is clearable. Publication prevents withdrawal during the process, but it does not prevent lapse when a later stage fails.
The recusal mechanic in Stage Two is the most unusual structural feature: the State seeking independence has no vote in whether the Republic lets it leave. That decision belongs to the Republic that remains. A State that is constitutionally successful in Stage One may still be held by a Stage Two that reflects how much the rest of the Republic needs it — or wants it gone.
The prohibition on inducement and coercion cuts both ways. The Republic cannot offer incentives to stay, and it cannot impose penalties for trying to leave. The process is genuinely neutral. Whether that neutrality favors independence movements or disfavors them depends entirely on the thresholds, the recusal math, and the political geography of any given State.