Whether the Argent Ridge Development Authorization Act falls within any category of statute rendered ineligible for repeal by referendum under §13.1(4).
The Panel does not determine whether the Act is wise, whether the petition will succeed, or whether the parcel ought to be conveyed. It determines one question and no other: may this statute be petitioned at all.
§13.1(4) renders three classes of statute ineligible:
(a) laws that solely or primarily expand an Article I right;
(b) budget laws;
(c) laws implementing a constitutionally mandated obligation.
The Panel applies these categories under §13.1(5). It has no discretion to add to them, and none to decline a petition for any reason outside them.
Not engaged. The Act conveys development and operational-use rights over a federal parcel. It expands no right enumerated in Article I and none was asserted.
Not engaged. No provision of this Constitution requires the Republic to convey the Argent Ridge parcel, to develop it, or to provide housing upon it. Submissions received from the delegation of the State of Norvane urge that the Act discharges an obligation arising from the arrival of persons across Lake Varda into that State. The Panel records the submission and notes its seriousness. It does not accept it. An obligation that a State feels is not an obligation that this Constitution mandates, and §13.1(4) speaks only of the latter. Necessity is not the same thing as mandate.
This is the substantial question and the Panel treats it as such.
The Act directs that revenue arising from the conveyance be allocated to the two host States, Varek and Norvane, by a formula written into the Act itself. The Norvane submission contends that a statute which allocates federal revenue by formula is a budget law within the ordinary meaning of the term, and is therefore beyond the reach of §13.1.
The Panel determines that it is not, for the following reasons.
First, a budget law appropriates or authorises expenditure. This Act does neither. It disposes of an asset and directs where the proceeds land. A statute that generates revenue and assigns its destination is not thereby a statute that spends.
Second, the allocation is consequential to the conveyance and not its object. Strike the revenue formula from the Act and a conveyance remains. Strike the conveyance and nothing remains at all. The Panel reads §13.1(4) as reaching a law's character, not its incidents.
Third, and the Panel states this plainly because it bears on every future petition: the construction urged would swallow the provision. Almost every statute of consequence moves money. Were a revenue clause sufficient to render a law a budget law, the Legislature could place any statute beyond citizen repeal by attaching a formula to it, and §13.1 would survive only for laws too trivial to have fiscal effect. The Panel declines a reading under which a right may be extinguished by drafting.
The Panel notes for the record that the Legislative Monitor's ongoing audit of legislative compliance (§13.1(5)) contains no published finding characterising the Act as a budget law, and that no party referenced one.
The Argent Ridge Development Authorization Act is ELIGIBLE for repeal by referendum under §13.1.
The petition may proceed to Phase One.
Phase One opens upon publication and runs up to 8 months. It requires signatures from citizens equal to the statutory percentage of eligible voters — not less than 0.5% nor more than 3% — in each of at least one-third of all States and Territories. The Panel notes that the threshold is jurisdictional and not national: signatures in excess of the requirement in one State do not assist a petition in any other.
Phase Two, if reached, runs up to 8 further months and requires 5% of eligible voters nationally. Signatures gathered in Phase One carry over and count toward that threshold.
Should the thresholds be met and verified, the Panel administers the referendum within 90 days. A simple majority of votes cast repeals the law immediately upon certification, subject to the turnout threshold fixed by the Legislature under §13.1(6).
The Panel draws attention, without recommendation, to a matter on which it is frequently asked: this determination does not suspend the Act. Nothing in §13.1 does. The Act is law today and remains law throughout Phase One, Phase Two, verification, and the referendum itself, until and unless a majority repeals it.
Any eligibility determination is challengeable in the Appellate Court within 14 days (§13.1(5)).
The window opens upon publication of this record and closes at the end of Year 13, Month 9, Day 12.
Any party may challenge. The Panel takes no position on whether any will.